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Research Question

Voter View

Poll and Vote Party Data

Vocabulary

Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)

Does an increase in voter number falsify
Duverger or Strategic Voting models developed in
Game Theory or Experimental Voting?

Hypotheses and Results
• As voter number increases:
• Strategic Voting decreases, but behavior is still more
strategic than randomness
• Duverger’s Law still holds

Methodology
• Our research utilized experimental human subject based testing via
researcher engineered computer software in laboratories.
• Participants were randomly drawn from an experimental economic
database of Chapman University, Orange, CA undergraduates
• Participants were controlled for major, gender and academic year.
• 12 Participants polled and voted in 24 Elections, each with randomly
generated monetarily induced party preferences
• Subjects were paid directly in cash at 1 experimental dollar to 1 USD.
The were given an endowment of $7 to $17. The mean payout was
around $15 for a 30 minute experiment.
• Elections consists of 2 stages: a Poll Stage and a Vote stage

• Plurality Voting: an electoral system in which political goods are
allocated based on which one receives the most votes
• Sincere Vote: a vote for a voter’s most preferred party
• Strategic Vote: a vote that for the party with a higher pivot probability,
but is still preferred to the party with the next highest pivot probability.
“Casting a vote that will count”
• Dominated Vote: a vote for the least favored party or for a party with
which is both less favored and less likely to win.

• Poll Stage: participants are shown their preferences and poll for their
party of choice based only on their party payoffs. The polls are turned
into a bar chart

• Misaligned vote: a Strategic, but Insincere vote

• Vote Stage: voters can see the results of the poll and can vote.
Payoffs are assigned by the monetary preference of each voter
corresponding to the party with the most votes.

• Herindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) gives poll/vote concentration over
parties. Mathematically it is the sum of the squared Vote shares. (e.g.
if1 party receives all votes, HHI = 1^2 =1, if 2 parties each receive 50%
of the votes than HHI = .5^2 +.5^2 = .5

• Election sizes used: 12 voter elections, 600 voter elections and
220,000 voter elections. Each simulation aided experiment had three
groups each corresponding to one of the election sizes.
• Simulated Voters had sophisticated human-approximating behavior
based on data gathered from experiments using only human subjects

Voting Behavior

Sincere

• Duverger’s Law: Plurality Rule elections favor two party outcomes

Voter Behavioral Data

• N is the number of parties
• s is the vote or poll share (%) of the
total electorate each party receives.
• Measures the poll vote concentration
across the electorate
• Used to show changes in
concentration

Simulated Voter Behavior
• Simulated Voter Behavior aims to be human-like not necessarily optimal,
the goal is to have the human voters behave as similarly as possible to how
they would behave all voters were human subjects
• Data was gathered from elections with all human subject participants and
used to create Markov chain decision matrices linking simulated voter’s to
participants by conditioning polls on previous polls and votes on elections
polls. These made simulated voters appear to “improve” their decisions as
voting and polling approach the steady state, emulating human learning.
• Subjects at the end of all experiments were “quizzed” to distinguish between
human voter and simulated voter decisions. The identification accuracy was
52% - statistically indistinguishable from random choices
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• Defection: Casting a strategic vote for a party other than the most
preferred. “Casting a misaligned Vote”

Gives the poll or vote concentration between the parties. Higher HHI means
more concentrated poll or vote share, lower indicates a more evenly
distributed poll or vote share among more parties
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